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ABSTRACT

Context processing is the foundation of a model of
cognitive control set forth by T.S. Braver and colleagues

(Braver et al., 2001).- According to this model, cognitive
functions, such as attention, inhibition and working

memory are the product of a single, context processing
mechanism. Deficits in context processing have been
associated with cognitive development in children, healthy

aging, as well as individuals suffering from
schizophrenia. The goal of the present investigation was

to apply Braver's model of cognitive control to groups

selected on their differences in trait anxiety and explore
their relationship. Performance on two versions of the

AX-CPT (Standard and Distracter) was compared between a
high and a low trait anxiety group. The results indicate

that there is evidence for group differences in context

processing related to trait anxiety level. Interestingly,

these differences were not evident during the Standard
AX-CPT and both groups displayed good context processing

regardless of trait anxiety level. However, when cognitive
demand was increased during the Distracter AX-CPT, stable

group differences indicated that although the low anxiety

group sustained good context processing, the high anxiety
group failed to do so. These results, although taken with
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caution, are an indication of the relationship between

anxiety and context processing deficits. These findings
warrant the need for future research of this relationship
and have important implications for both the field of

basic cognitive research, as well as research that can be
applied to the understanding of the origin and

perpetuation of anxiety symptoms and their impact on the
workplace.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
People in today's world must function more like
impeccably programmed computers in order to efficiently

process the endless stream of information coming from the
environment. An enormous portion of the stimuli that reach
the senses are being processed by the nervous system
almost automatically without leaving a conscious trace.
This processing system must be designed to work in our
best interest and the end result of its work that is

brought to one's conscious attention must ensure
efficiency and promote survival, at the least. On one

hand, in every day life we benefit from the automatic
nature of processes - from maintaining normal vital
function, vision, hearing to reading, driving and playing

a familiar musical piece on the piano. On the other hand,
people desire to be highly motivated, independent

cognitive individuals who are able to freely and

voluntarily control their behavior. The question of how
independent the voluntary and automatic processes actually
are has been investigated not once in the literature.

1

Context Processing
Introduction to Cognitive Control

The study of high-level cognition processes is of
fundamental significance for the understanding of the
human psyche. The complexity of the mechanisms behind

processes such as attention, inhibition, decision-making
and problem solving is often. To exercise cognitive

control means to be able to override a reflexatory

,

reaction to a particular stimulus in favor of a more
complex and sophisticated sequence of actions. Thus, it is

difficult to study cognitive control in animal models. We
take for granted the exquisite ability of the human brain

to maintain the body still while a doctor is administering

a painful but life saving treatment or to solve an algebra
problem in a creative and innovative way. Cognitive

control can assist with a top-down approach to solve a
particular problem or make a decision, rather than relying

solely on what is presented as stimuli in the immediate

environment. In other words, it represents the ability to
actively suppress a particular train of thought or an

automatic reaction or to dynamically switch one's
attention from one task to another.
Cognitive control is one if the manifestations of the

highly developed human brain and its exceedingly powerful
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abilities to act and not simply react in the environment.

People are faced with the necessity to learn and perform
new skills and tasks that are high in complexity and

demand cognitive power. In summary, using cognitive

control one is able to selectively attend to task relevant
information in the environment, use memory capacity and

previously stored information effectively while inhibiting

irrelevant and distractive stimuli.
Context Processing Model of Cognitive Control

A recently developed model of cognitive control
allows for all three of its major components (attention,

inhibition and working memory) to be examined within a
single processing unit (Braver et al., 2001; Braver &

Barch, 2002). According to Braver and his colleagues,
exercising cognitive control effectively results in the
ability to flexibly adapt to the different demands of the

environment and act accordingly. Braver proposed that

successful execution of the cognitive functions related to
attention and inhibition can be accomplished by actively
representing and maintaining all information that is

relevant. In Braver's model any relevant information is
what is referred to as the context. Thus, by effectively
maintaining the context, one can successfully focus

attention to important stimuli, appropriately inhibit
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irrelevant ones and therefore minimize interference and
maximize performance. This function is undertaken by a

context-processing unit which regulates all information
that may guide future behavior, and it is proposed to

function as a separate mechanism within working memory
(Braver & Barch, 2002) .

Nearly every situation a person encounters on a daily

basis calls for a sequence of covert (thoughts) and overt
(behavior) processes that are appropriate for the specific

situation. In many cases, a particular behavior, such as

answering a ringing telephone is absolutely appropriate.

Answering a telephone while driving, however, may not only
be out of place, but it can endanger someone. Successfully
exercised cognitive control allows for the two situations

to be differentiated and for the behavior to be displayed

in the former and inhibited in latter. The set of rules in
this case, that determine in which situation to answer the

telephone, could be thought of as the context. In Braver's

theory, context is defined as a form of an internal
representation of any information that may be related to

an ongoing task or behavior (Braver & Barch, 2002). Thus,
context can be the mental framework which when at work can
lead to accurate decisions on what behavior is executed

and what inhibited, which stimuli in the environment are
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attended to and which are ignored. Using context
successfully can lead the individual to attain a

particular target, such as following a particular strategy
can help a chess player to win an important match. This
means that the player must plan which figures to move

sometimes well in advance in order to fit his/her strategy

goal. Therefore, working within a particular context can
also guide subsequent decisions. The representation of

context is thought to be very active and a constantly
updating unit. Naturally, in a dynamic environment where

changes occur at a high rate, keeping up with the initial
"instructions" from the context can be challenging. For
example, taking the moves made by the chess player

independent from one another places different demands on
one's cognitive control than if they were to be considered
part of an overarching strategy to corner an opponent and

win the game. Not taking an obviously unprotected

opponent's figure in order to follow a predetermined path
can be difficult at the time but beneficial in the long
run. In the same way, context processing is especially

important when a routinely appropriate behavior has to be
inhibited in order for a goal oriented one to take place.

In fact, intact context processing leads to attention and
inhibition without directly exercising either process.
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Attending or inhibiting a particular aspect of the

environment, for example is facilitated by the information

used in the context-processing unit. A key feature of
Braver's model is that its components account for

processes involved not only in inhibitory responses, but
also in ones that require attention. The benefit to

Braver's model, however, is that they are not being

examined independently but as underlying processes of a
single context-processing unit.

Neurobiology
A crucial part of Braver's research is aimed to

establish the idea that there are active neurobiological

pathways responsible for his model of cognitive control
(Braver et al., 2001). The internal representations of the

context, as well as their active maintenance are suggested

to be neural pathways in a portion of the brain, called

the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DL-PFC). This brain
region is associated with higher cognitive functioning,

decision-making and problem solving, as well as with the
processes related to working memory. Interestingly, the

neurotransmitter dopamine (DA) has an active network of
pathways in the DL-PFC and it has been associated to

various cognitive processes, such as attention and
inhibition (Braver et al., 2001). For example, tasks that
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require the active use of working memory have been shown

to suffer serous deficits in performance for individuals

with lower levels of DA (Luciana, Collins, & Depue, 1998).
When a small dose of a DA antagonist was administered to
participants in their experiment, performance on a

cognitive control task seemed to deteriorate in comparison
with participants with normal DA levels (Braver et al.,

2001; Cohen, Braver, & Brown, 2002). Therefore, Braver's

theory aims to establish a possible model where the DL-PFC
region of the brain and DA play an important role in
cognitive processing, namely the active representation and

update of relevant context.

The specific function that each of the above

components plays in cognitive processing has not been
clearly explained by previous research. DA seems to be
associated with cognitive deficits and lesions to the

DL-PFC appear to result in cognitive impairment, but the
precise mechanisms through which this takes place have
been successfully presented only in Braver's model. There
are several key components of Braver's neural network that
will be described in detail next (Figure 1). First, the

system has an input flow where the incoming information
from the environment enters directly (input unit). Then
this information undergoes some internal processing and

7

eventually results in some response. This process simply
describes a stimulus - response pattern. When taking
context processing into, account, Braver adds a component

that he calls the "context layer". The context layer,

which is found within the DL-PFC, serves as a mediator of
the simple stimulus - response reaction. The incoming flow

is being affected by the context before it is being
released as a response. Braver points out three important
characteristics of the context layer that cause its
influence over the stimulus-response system (Figure 1).

First, an active network of neuronal connections is
especially pronounced in the context layer. This network's

purpose is to keep the information in the

context-processing unit in active circulation and
maintenance. Thus, even if the initial stream of incoming

information is being interrupted, the context unit can

sustain content and continue to feed into the response

pathways. This process is called updating. This, in turn,
is possible because the context unit has pathways
connecting to the direct stimulus-response pathways.

Interestingly, there are two independent pathways relaying
information from and back to the context-processing unit.
The first pathway, from the context unit to the direct
stimulus-response pathway, serves to "bias" otherwise
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independent events with the information that is being
actively represented in the context-processing unit. For
instance, if we go back to our chess player example, the

strategy of winning the match is being actively
represented and maintained in the context-processing unit.

If we take each move independently, the direct stimulus
response pathway may be a sufficient mechanism. However,
when the player has to choose among several options, the

context-processing unit will activate its connection to
the direct pathway in order to produce a biased response
favoring the overall strategy to win the game over any

other possible move. Interestingly, this is true
especially when the player has to show patience and

inhibit an obvious, dominant move. This is a perfect
example of cognitive control and inhibition where a weaker
pathway can influence the response over a stronger one.

An interesting question, however, may be asked - how

can the chess player keep his/her strategy protected from
all incoming information resulting from the progress of

the game and at the same time adjust it according to the

opponent's surprising moves? This incoming information may
be distractive and irrelevant and it is crucial for the

chess player to protect his/her game strategy intact and
focused. According to Braver's model, the context
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processing unit is somewhat protected from the constant
flow of information. Its second connection, the one coming
from the direct pathway, does not allow the free and
constant flow to enter the context unit. It serves as a

gateway that protects and feeds into the unit whenever
appropriate. It has been suggested that DA projections

assist in accomplishing this complicated process (Braver
et al., 2001). When the dopamine neurons are active,
information can enter the context layer so it is in
connection with any changes in the incoming demands as
well as its context representations are being updated. In

turn, when the pathway is not active, no incoming
information enters the context-processing layer,
preserving its contents from competing and distracting

stimuli. In summary, Braver's model represents an active,
neural based system that allows for information to be
actively represented in a single context processing unit,

which serves as the basis for both the attentional and
inhibitory functions of cognitive control.

Testing Braver's Model
To test his model, Braver (Braver et al., 2001;

Braver & Barch, 2002) adopted a computer-based cognitive
task known as the AX-CPT (Continuous Performance Task).

The main -goal of the participant in the AX-CPT is to
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differentiate between target and non-target trials as

quickly and accurately as possible. In the AX-CPT each
trial consists of a sequential presentation of two letters

- cue and probe (Figure 3). The target trials are those
where a letter "A" is the cue and letter "X" is the probe.
All other combinations of letters are to be regarded as

non-target and responded to as such. For the purposes of

the description of the task, every non-A cue will be
referred to as a B-cue and every non-X probe will be

referred to as a Y-probe. Therefore, a condition which
consists of a cue letter "A" and a non-X probe will be
referred to as the AY condition; a non-A cue and an X
probe will be referred to as a BX condition, and a non-A

cue combined with a non-X probe will be a BX condition.
Braver suggested that these conditions, serve as a test for

how well context is represented in one's working memory.
To create particular cognitive biases, the proportion of
target and non-target trials is manipulated within a test
list. In fact, participants are exposed to target trials

(AX) 70% of the time. This manipulation has specific

consequences - two cognitive biases are created. First, an
expectation bias occurs when the cue letter A is

presented. Individuals learn to use the cue letter A to
predict the occurrence of a target probe X because this,
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in fact, is the case with 70% of the trials. In this case,

context processing serves as an agent that directs one's
attention to task relevant information - the target letter
A. This bias becomes evident on trials where the cue

letter A is not.followed by the usual target probe X, but

by any non-X letter. In these situations, individuals are

more inclined to respond to the trial as a target even if
the probe is a non-X letter and they should regard it as a
non-target trial. As a result, AY trials become

susceptible to false alarm type of responses. Further,
every time individuals are presented with a target probe

"X", their response is also affected by the same bias.

They must use context processing effectively to inhibit
the reactive response to a target probe "X" on trials with
non-A cues (.BX trials) . As a result, the BX trials become

susceptible to false alarm errors as well and serve as an

indicator for how well the inhibitory properties of the

context-processing unit are functioning.
The AX-CPT is a suitable way to test Braver's model

of context processing also because it simultaneously
accounts for processes underlying attention and
inhibition. Braver suggests that both these principles are

functioning within the idea of context processing (Braver

et al., 2001). Specifically, when context is represented
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internally it can guide one's attention toward a
particular stimulus or serve as an inhibitory agent for

another stimulus. Generally, each trial provides two
pieces of information - one comes from the cue and one

from the probe. In some instances, the cue and probe are

consistent as indicators for a target or non-target
/
response. For example, when the cue letter is A and the
probe letter is X, the response should be a target
response and both cue and probe correspond to it. When

there is a non-target cue (any non-A letter) and a
non-target probe (any non-X letter), the response should
be non-target and it should be facilitated because both
cue and probe indicate a non-target response. Therefore,

in the AX and BY trials, cue and probe both suggest a

particular response (target or non target). As mentioned
earlier, the bias created by the high frequency of AX

target trials creates a specific bias whenever the cue A
and probe X are presented. Making a correct response is
more challenging when the cue suggests a target response,

but the probe is a non-target one, or vice versa (BX and
AY trails). For instance, inhibition is required in BX

trials where the participant has to use the representation
of the cue B actively in order to suppress a target

response to the probe X. Having a preserved representation
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of the cue B, as a non-target cue, helps for the

successful inhibition of a subsequent target response to
the target probe. Therefore, superior inhibition is tested
for and evident on all BX trials. Specifically, on BX

trials good context processing leads to a decrease in the
amount of errors - participants correctly identify B as a
non-target cue and successfully inhibit target response,

thus eliciting a correct response. On the other hand, the
same representation on context can impair performance on

other trials, namely, when a participant is presented with
an AY trial. In this case, the active representation of

the target cue A prepares for a strong tendency for a
target response to the probe even if it is not a target
probe X. Good context processing, in this case, impairs
performance on AY trials.

In summary, good context processing is evident when
participants make few errors in BX trials, where they have
effectively used the non-target cue B and inhibited the

target response to the target probe X (Figure 2). Also,
good context processing is evident when participants

commit more errors in AY trials. Here, the target cue A is
vividly represented in context processing and facilitated

by the 70% AX rate bias leads to a false alarm and thus a

target response on a non-target probe Y. This is
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counterintuitive in the sense that more errors in AY

condition suggest good context processing, but when the
data are examined carefully the distinct pattern of

responses on BX and AY trials can be a great illustration

of how context can lead to attention or inhibition on the

same task. More specifically, examining performance in

these two types, of trials one can collect evidence for the
quality of context processing and can further specify
whether potential problems are due to impaired attention,
or impaired inhibition or both.
Manipulating the delay between cue and probe

presentation allows for additional examination of context

processing. Namely, according to Braver's model the
representation of context has to be actively represented,

maintained and updated over some period of time in order
for good performance to occur (Braver et al., 2001). If

this is fact is the case, manipulating the length of delay
between cue and probe provides additional information. For
instance, if context processing is intact, the difference

between a trial with a short cue-probe delay and a trial

with a longer delay would not be pronounced. If the
representation of the cue and maintenance of context

function properly, increasing the delay should not affect

performance. If, however, context processing is impaired,
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cue-probe delay variations will be evident in a distinct
pattern of results (Figure 3). Specifically, if the cue

representation is decaying over the duration of the delay,

there will be more errors in the long delay BX condition
in comparison with errors in the short delay BX condition.

Interestingly, errors in the long delay AY condition will
decrease in comparison with errors in a short delay AY,

because of the decayed cue representation and its reduced
similarity to the target response. A fascinating aspect of

the AX-CPT task is that each condition relies on a
distinct cognitive process (attention or inhibition, for

example) and good performance is granted when a distinct
mechanism within the context-processing unit is

functioning properly (cue representation or maintenance,
for example). This way the model makes very specific

predictions about the behavioral pattern of responses on

the AX-CPT task and can be a useful tool in identifying
cognitive impairments that are due to context processing

deficits.
Studies on Healthy Aging

Deficits across various cognitive domains have been
documented to accompany healthy aging adults (Braver et

al., 2001). For instance, impairments concerning episodic
and working memory are evident; also, studies with older
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adults have revealed problems with selective attention and

inhibition. Braver suggests that there is a single
underlying mechanism that deteriorates with age and is

responsible for these multiple deficits (Braver et al.,
2001). Braver's results come mainly from studies on aging,
where poor context processing is observed in Alzheimer's

patients whose cognitive functioning is grossly impaired
by profound brain cell loss (Braver & Barch, 2002).
Alzheimer's patients have immense difficulty with

inhibition and therefore commit a large number of errors

as a result of the inhibition bias, in comparison with
healthy control individuals. Alzheimer's patients commit
significantly fewer errors in the attention bias, which
signals poor attention and representation. In other words,
Braver's model relates disturbances found in the DL-PFC

and the DA system with the behavioral deficits displayed

by the aging population. A similar pattern is displayed by

the healthy aging population (Braver & Cohen, 2001; Braver
& Barch, 2002) . When compared to control participants, the
aging sample displays a very distinct pattern of results

on the AX-CPT task. Namely, performance dependent on

effective inhibition suffers and is demonstrated with
increased the error rate on BX trials. Thus, the inability
to inhibit a target response is present. Also, a decreased
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amount of AY errors signals problems with attention, where
the target cue A is not being represented affectively. If

good context processing, as explained in the above

paragraphs, is demonstrated by a lot of AY errors and few

BX errors, healthy aging adult sample displays nearly the

opposite pattern - fewer AY errors and many BX errors.
In other words, according to Braver's model, the
natural deterioration of the DL-PFC with age is the single
underlying mechanism that affects the effectiveness of the

context processing unit and is therefore the basis for the
various cognitive deficits displayed by older adults.

Anxiety
Working Memory

One common goal of science is to explain the changes
in behavior that are observed among different populations.

It is especially valuable when parsimony is achieved and
multiple behavioral manifestations are associated with a

single underlying mechanism. It is interesting to observe

that there are other populations that exhibit similar,
cognitive deficits to the ones investigated by Braver and
his colleagues. Anxiety patients, for instance, display

impairments in multiple cognitive tasks that rely on
attention, inhibition and working memory. Nevertheless, a
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unitary concept of the anxiety symptomatology is lacking

in current literature'. The purpose of the following review

of relevant literature is to demonstrate that although
deficits in cognitive processes persist among individuals
with anxiety symptoms, there is no agreement as to what

mechanisms are responsible. A potential benefit of

applying Braver's model to an anxiety sample is to capture

a distinct behavioral pattern of responses that can be
accounted for by deficits in the context processing

mechanism. The concept of working memory was first

proposed in 1974 as an alternative to the established
model of short-term memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974).

Instead of a storage unit alone, the new model described
an active system where information was being perceived,

transformed, integrated and stored. Working memory,
according the Baddeley, is an information-processing unit

composed of three major subcomponents. The most known and
well-studied aspect of working memory is the phonological

loop, or the fragment responsible for auditory stimuli.

Also, it manipulates speech-related information such as
language. The second component, the visuospatial
sketchpad, holds and integrates both visual and spatial
information. The executive component of working memory is

the least investigated and is assumed to supervise,
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integrate and govern incoming information from other two

components, ultimately affecting behavior (Baddeley &
Hitch, 1974). This way, the processes that occur within

working memory assist one's response decision when

competing stimuli are presented.

A large number of findings in the literature suggest
that there is a link between performance on working memory

tasks and anxiety. In fact, it has been demonstrated that

high levels of anxiety are related to performance

deficits. Empirical studies contrasting groups of

individuals with high and low anxiety levels provide
evidence to support this notion. In an experiment

conducted by Macleod and Donnellan (1993), high and low

anxiety students engaged in a reasoning task. Their
performance was measured in two distinct conditions of

high and low memory load. As expected, students in the
high anxiety group were slower in the reasoning task

displaying need for more time for decision making.

Interestingly, differences in the high and low memory load
condition were found to affect the groups in a similar

way. Indeed, the high memory load harshly disadvantaged
the elevated anxiety group suggesting that limited working
memory capacity is related to the performance deficit
(MacLeod & Donnellan, 1993). In other words, anxiety
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itself can put a strain on one's working memory capacity,
and thus impair the ability to perform well.

Attention and Inhibition
Deficits in attention and inhibition are commonly

found in individuals suffering from anxiety (Baddeley &

Hitch, 1974; Kane & Engle, 2003). The approach through
which scientists have examined these two processes,
however, is far from unanimous. Some studies look at

attention problems only; others focus on deficits in
inhibition. Nevertheless, it is rather difficult to think

of just attention or inhibition because they are like the
flip sides of the same coin. When a person is attending

actively to something, he/she is also actively inhibiting

other stimuli that are present in the environment. Thus,
the following review of literature will entail experiments
that aim to reveal the role of both attention and
inhibition among individuals suffering from anxiety.
Attention represents a perceptual process in which an

organism actively focuses on a particular aspect of the

environment while excluding the surroundings (Ackerman,

1987). To ignore certain aspects of. the environment,
however, is a dynamic and demanding process as well, and
it is referred to as cognitive inhibition. Therefore,

successful interaction with the world depends on one's
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ability to both focus and sustain attention upon relevant,

stimuli, and selectively inhibit distractor stimuli that
are irrelevant to the task at stake. Previous findings

suggest that the proper function of working memory is
tightly related to both attention and inhibition.

According to a model developed by Hasher and Zacks (1988),
attentional inhibition regulates any information that
enters or leaves working memory. For instance, inhibitory
mechanisms filter goal irrelevant stimuli before they

enter working memory, thus allowing only goal relevant
ones to be attended to. Thus, attention inhibition and
working memory can prove to be quite useful in tasks where

the target/non-target stimuli can change, or when one has

to switch attention between relevant and irrelevant
stimuli.
The Stroop Task
A popular measure of attention and inhibition in the
past few decades has been the Stroop task. Here,

participants are presented with words on a screen and are

instructed to report the color of ink in which the words
appear while ignoring the word's meaning (Kane & Engle,

.
2003)

In some cases, the meaning of the word and its

color facilitate performance; for instance, the word
"yellow" appearing in yellow ink, or the word "green" in

22

green ink. When participants encounter words that conflict

with their color, such as the word "yellow" appearing in
green ink, performance is compromised. It has been
observed time and again, that when presented with
conflicting stimuli most people tend to slow their
response rate. In reference to cognitive control,

successfully attending to the relevant feature of the

stimulus (the color), while inhibiting the irrelevant one

(the meaning of the word) ensures successful performance
and, it is a sign of good processing skills.

It is believed that individuals who report
experiencing anxiety symptoms perform differently on

experimental tasks that put a high demand on cognitive
processes, such as the Stroop task. A modified version of

this task has been used largely to investigate an

attentional bias that is exhibited by anxiety patients.
Similar to the original version, in the emotional Stroop

task, individuals are asked to name the color a word is

printed in without reading the word itself For this
version of the task, anxiety related and neutral words are

presented in different color ink (MacLeod, 1991). The goal
is to name the color the word is written in as fast as
possible. Generally, when participants are presented with

stimuli (words) that are anxiety provoking (e.g. death,
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faint, rape etc.) their performance is diminished in
comparison with performance to neutral stimuli. The

intuition behind the emotional Stroop is that the semantic
content of a word can produce additional interference
(MacLeod, 1991). Specifically, reaction times are
significantly slower in the anxiety condition, indicating

that there is a bias for anxiety related information. In
other words, anxiety related stimuli have the ability to
involuntary capture one's attention and interfere with the

speed of response. Further, the slower reaction times
suggest that the participants may have a difficult time
inhibiting the meaning of the anxiety related words, which
in itself can degrade response time performance.

Good performance on the modified Stroop task can be
achieved if the participants are able to successfully

inhibit the meaning of the words and focus exclusively on
the color that they are printed in. The use of this
strategy, however, is being compromised among individuals
with anxiety symptoms. This finding suggests that high

anxiety individuals exhibit an attentional bias toward
emotionally loaded stimuli; therefore, it takes longer for

one to attend and name the color of a word if his/her
attention is first drawn to the meaning of the word.
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However, results from emotional Stroop paradigms do

not always replicate. Interestingly, there are instances

when individuals with high anxiety are slower to name both
neutral and loaded words (Mogg & Marden, 1990). One
possible explanation for this discrepancy comes from the
fact that individuals with high anxiety differ

tremendously on stimuli that may be triggering their

symptoms (gun shot for a post traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) sufferer, a spider for a person with

arachnophobia). Further, most robust interference on the

emotional Stroop task has been reported when the loaded

words are particularly trigger specific (Hope et al.,
1990; Buckley, Blanchard, & Hickling, 2002; Thorpe &

Salkovskis, 1997). MacLeod (1991) suggests that the
specificity of the emotionally loaded words could serve as

a confound explanation. In other words, war veterans who
suffer from PTSD will respond slower to trauma words

related to combat because these’are especially relevant
for them. In this case, the discrepancy in the literature

is explained by the selection of stimuli, rather than a
particular processing mechanism.

Dot-Probe Task
Another popular task used to assess processing
biases, especially attentional bias in various
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populations, is the dot probe paradigm. In this task,

individuals are asked to determine whether a dot has been
presented on the left or right side of the screen. Before
each presentation, two images appear on the screen.

Similar to the emotional Stroop task, pictures are chosen

to be either neutral or emotionally loaded. In anxiety
individuals, it has been observed that response time
decreases when the dot is preceded by an emotionally

loaded picture with the same location. In other words, it
may be the case that emotionally loaded images selectively

draw attention, which facilitates response if the dot
emerges in the same location as the picture (Bradley,

Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998).
It appears that individuals with elevated anxiety
attend to emotionally loaded or threat related stimuli

more readily.than to neutral ones compared to individuals
with normal anxiety level. Anew line of research, however,
suggests that there may be some evolutionary component in

the way we chose which stimuli to process and which to
ignore. With a version of the dot probe task, Lipp and

Derakshan (2005), tested the idea that attention bias may
be observed among a sample of individuals without anxiety

problems when pictures of fear-relevant animals are

presented. Pictures of snakes and spiders were
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distinguished as "phylogenetically prepared stimuli" and
as such were to produce attentional bias in individuals
who did not report a history of snake or spider phobia.

The results of this investigation suggest that this in
fact is the case. Attentional bias toward the fear-related

pictures was observed across the entire sample. An
important implication here is the fact that preferential

processing of fear related stimuli inflates the observed
attentional bias. For other anxiety related stimuli,
however, the effect may be underreported. Thus, although
widely researched, attention bias in individuals with high

levels of anxiety emerges to be a controversial

phenomenon.
Information Processing Bias

The effective interaction with one's immediate
environment requires not only successfully allocating
attention to relevant stimuli, but also filtering out

those that are unimportant. Logically, it seems to be the

case that by preventing such information from processing,
more cognitive resources are being directed to relevant
stimuli, ensuring more efficient performance. In the
anxiety literature, deficiencies with inhibition are
generally linked to individuals with high levels of
anxiety. The specific processes that underlie this

27

phenomenon, however, seem to have escaped a
straightforward explanation.

One venue of research studies aimed at clarifying the
role of cognitive inhibition as a factor in maintaining

anxiety symptoms has focused on examining specific

cognitive biases that come about when interpreting
ambiguous information. Since the individual is constantly

bombarded with information from the environment, it is not
uncommon for ambiguous stimuli to be a subject of
interpretation. It has been suggested that elevated

anxiety influences one's interpretation of such indistinct
information (Richard & French, 1993). In other words, when

it comes to uncertain input of information, individuals

with high anxiety tend to process ambiguous information
(events, bodily sensations, memories) in a threat favoring
way. In an experiment performed by Clark et al.

(as cited

in McNally, 1999b), panic disorder patients were asked to
rate ambiguous bodily sensations (e.g., heart

palpitations) as neutral or threatening. It was revealed
that an interpretive bias existed, where heart
palpitations, for instance, were very often related to a
pending heart attack and serious illness rather than a

brief condition. These findings can also suggest that the

individual failed to inhibit the unpleasant, fearful or
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threatening meaning and all cognitive resource was

directed in the direction of the negative stimulus.
Evolutionarily, a similar strategy makes perfect sense -

recognizing real danger among a vast array of potentially
threatening stimuli will most definitely be an advantage.

Overdoing it, however, can prevent the organism from

focusing on other vital resources in the environment and
can also create a very negative, life-threatening setting.

In a clever experiment, Wood, Mathews, and Dalgleish
(2001) used sentences containing ambiguous words with a

positive and negative possible meaning, to illustrate the

idea that individuals with elevated anxiety have a
deficiency in inhibiting negative information. The task
consisted of presenting sentences that ended with a

homograph (words that have identical spelling but

different meaning), such as "At the party she had some
punch". The meaning of the sentence was consistent with a

positive/neutral meaning of the homograph. However,
participants were asked to determine whether a probe word

was either related or unrelated to the sentence. Probe

words in the test condition were related to the negative
meaning of the homograph, such as the word "fist" would be

to the example sentence above. In other words, at a first
glance the word "fist" is not related to the above
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sentence, unless both meanings of the word "punch" are

active (a party drink and a painful strike). With intact
inhibition, the participant would quickly reject the word
"fist" as being related to the sentence. The negative
meaning of the "punch" homograph has been successfully

inhibited. It was expected, that individuals with high

anxiety would exhibit longer reaction times in comparison

with individuals with normal anxiety levels, signalling
inhibition deficits. Interestingly, this was not the case.
Reaction times for people with anxiety were comparable to

the ones displayed by the control participants. However,
when working memory load during the task was increased,

the deficiency in inhibiting the negative meaning surfaced
and interference in reaction times was recorded (Wood,

Mathews, & Dalgleish, 2003). These results are in

accordance with the notion that effective inhibition
requires the availability of cognitive recourses, such as
working memory for instance. Because these resources are

limited, the processes that depend on them compete for
their allocation. One possible implication is that
anxiety, the state of being aroused, takes up a certain

amount of the available cognitive resource, taking away

from processes such as attention and inhibition (Eysenk &
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Calvo, 1992). Therefore, competing processes depending on
this resource are impaired.

The Present Investigation

The main goal of this investigation is to demonstrate
that Braver and colleagues (Braver at al., 2001) context
processing theory of cognitive control provides a

parsimonious explanation of processing deficits found in

those showing anxiety symptoms. Braver has shown that the
execution of processes such as attention, inhibition and
working memory can be accounted for by a single mechanism

- the context-processing unit. Interestingly, deficits in
the same cognitive processes (attention, inhibition and
working memory) have been revealed in the current anxiety

literature (Liebert & Morris, 1967; MacLeod, 1991a; Mogg &
Marden, 1980) as common symptoms in individuals with high

anxiety. To date, no research has been conducted to

determine whether anxiety sufferers show increased
deficits in context processing relative to'non-anxiety

sufferers. In the present study, we aim to establish a
direct link between insufficiencies in context processing

and cognitive deficits related to anxiety symptoms and
thus enhance the overall understanding of the underlying
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mechanisms of the observed discrepancies in cognitive

performance.
Participants in the present study will be selected on

the basis of their scores on a widely used measure of
anxiety, the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, Form Y (STAI,

Spielberg, 1983). The STAI contains two scales (STAI-Y-1
and STAI-Y-2) that are designed to measure levels of trait

and state anxiety independently. State anxiety refers to
an emotional arousal that an individual experiences in the

immediate face of real or perceived danger. It is the
normal and adaptive reaction to an urgent threat in the

environment that is displayed by all individuals. For
example, hearing a loud gun shot elicits a moment of

increased heart rate, sweating, pupil dilation and worry

in everybody. The result is that the' organism mobilizes

its resources to react to the pending dangerous situation

- the basic flight or fight response. Subsequently, when
the situation is safe and the organism calms down, the

state anxiety is eliminated. On the other hand, trait
anxiety is defined as being a stable characteristic and is
associated with an established individual difference

characterized by a heightened state anxiety response. An

individual with high trait anxiety is more likely to
respond with an elevated state anxiety in a wide variety
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of situations that may not necessarily represent immediate
danger. It is normal and adaptive to react with fear and

anxiety to a dangerous situation, but when there is no
need for such reaction, unnecessary anxiety results in

lasting and disruptive symptoms. Individuals with high

trait anxiety tend to display increased levels of state

anxiety in situations that may not be of potential threat
or danger, thus the adaptability of the response loses its

functionality. If an individual's level of trait anxiety

is within a normal range, state anxiety is experienced
only when real danger is present or an extremely stressful

situation arises. Thus, our interest was focused on the
relationship between trait anxiety and context processing,

independent of state anxiety in an attempt to detect a
stable effect that persist whether in threatening or

non-threatening situation.

The STAI-Y-2 will be used to establish the basis for
the selection of individuals with high and low trait
anxiety. Thus, participants will be divided into high and

low anxiety groups based solely on their trait anxiety

scores. Levels of state anxiety, however, must be taken
into consideration as well. The reasoning behind this
concern is that individuals with high trait anxiety tend

to experience elevated state anxiety as well. This is true
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for a wide variety of situations that can be threatening

or not, novel or familiar. Thus, it is possible that

individuals in the HA group will not only possess greater
levels of trait anxiety than individuals the LA group, but

greater levels of state anxiety as well. As a result, any
difference found in context processing between the HA and
LA groups could be attributable to either increased trait

or state anxiety. In order to help alleviate the

potentially confounding effect of state anxiety on context

processing performance, in the present study, state
anxiety will be measured and treated as a covariate. By
doing so, the relationship between trait anxiety and
context processing can be examined while controlling for

the effects of state anxiety.
Recall the basic premise of the AX-CPT described

earlier in this paper. Participants are presented with

single letters one at a time on a computer screen and are
required to press the target key when the letter "X" is
presented, but only if the letter "A" preceded it. The

processes of attention and inhibition are a natural
consequence of good context processing and are thus
absolutely necessary for one's performance on the AX-CPT

(Lorsbach & Reimer, in press). To illustrate this, take an
important aspect in the design of the AX-CPT - the
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disproportionally high rate at which the AX target trials
appear (70%). There are two important consequences of this

high proportion. First, an expectancy bias to the letter
"A" is built. Participants develop high readiness to press

the target button to the letter "A" because 70% of the
time it is followed by the letter "X" to complete a target

trial. Thus, attention to the letter "A" facilitates
performance on the target AX trials. However, the same

bias proves detrimental on AY trials where participants

must resist pressing the target button. Further, a second
bias toward making a target response when the probe is the

letter "X", even with a non-A cue (BX trials) is formed.

The concept here is similar - the high rate of AX trials
builds an urge in participants to press target every time
they see an "X". In the case of BX trials, one must

successfully inhibit the urge to press target by using the
representation of the non-target cue "B" (Lorsbach &

Reimer, in press).

Also, performance on the AX-CPT relies on the active
representation and maintenance of context and therefore

provides an excellent opportunity for their examination.
For instance, variations in the quality of context
representation and maintenance results in predictable
performance patterns on AY and BX trials. Details about
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these patterns will be provided in the following
paragraphs. Performance in the BY trials does not depend

on either good representation or maintenance of context
and therefore can be considered as a baseline condition.

In some of his experiments, Braver (Braver & Barch,

2002) manipulated the delay between, cue and probe by
having a short (1 sec) and long (5 sec) delay. The
difference between the two delays lies in the fact that in
the long delay condition participants not only have to
represent the cue as relevant context, they must maintain

it during the delay. In the present investigation, we will
adopt a long (5 sec) delay between cue and probe for all

trials because it allows for both representation and
maintenance of context to be examined simultaneously.
If context processing is good, individuals should be
able to successfully inhibit the tendency to press the

target key on BX trials and thus the error rate should be

lower and reaction times faster in comparison with AY
trials. On the other hand, good context processing hinders
performance on AY trials because the large number of AX

trails creates an expectancy bias toward pressing the
target key when the cue is "A". Therefore, with good
context processing, performance on AY trails leads to more
errors and slower reaction time than performance on BX
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trials. When context processing is impaired, the opposite

is expected - errors and reaction times on the BX trials
should surpass errors and reaction times on AY trials.
Thanks to the delay between cue and probe, context

maintenance also can be examined. Therefore, if context
maintenance is good, individuals should perform well on BX
trials, which require active maintenance of the inhibitory
cue "B," and should successfully inhibit the tendency to

press the target key. Error rates on BX trials should be
lower and reaction times faster than AY trials. On the

other hand, good context maintenance comes at a cost in
the AY condition. Here, the expectancy bias to press the
target key when the cue is "A" is maintained over the
delay and results in more errors and slower reaction times

in comparison with the BX trials. If context maintenance

is impaired, error rates will increase dramatically in the
BX condition because participants will fail to inhibit the
overwhelming tendency to press the target key when they

encounter an "X" probe. Conversely, performance on the

expectancy-hindered AY trials should improve. Failing to

maintain the cue representation over a long delay lessens
the expectancy, thus, improving performance. In short,
with context maintenance problems, performance will

improve on AY trials and worsen on BX trials.
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Examining context processing in individuals with
elevated trait anxiety leads to straightforward

predictions regarding performance on the AX-CPT. If

context processing is impaired, individuals in the high
anxiety group will.display fewer errors and faster

reaction times on AY trails in comparison with individuals
in the low anxiety group. Also, the high anxiety group
will show impaired performance on BX trials (more errors

and slower reaction times) in comparison with individuals

in the low anxiety group.

A possibility exists, however, that, the effects of

anxiety on context processing may not be displayed unless

there is an increased level of demand on one's cognitive
processing. Some studies suggest that unless there is a

demand for cognitive resources, differences between high
and low anxiety groups may be undetected. Thus,
performance on the standard AX-CPT described above may not
differ for the two anxiety groups. To explore this

possibility, a high-demand version of the AX-CPT,
subsequently referred to as Distracter task, will be used.

In this version, a sequence of three distracter stimuli
(letters in different color and font) will be presented

during the delay (5 sec) between the cue and probe (See
Figure 4). The goal of the task remains the same as in the
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Standard AX-CPT - to identify and respond to a target
probe "X" but only when it is preceded by a target cue
"A". Attention, inhibition, as well as intact
representation and maintenance of the cue are once again
essential for the successful performance on the task.
However, unlike the Standard AX-CPT, the high demand

version requires participants to actively protect and keep
the cue representation intact while being presented with
interfering, competing stimuli. It is often thought that

individuals who suffer from anxiety are not able to
inhibit persistent thoughts or threatening stimuli in
their environment and that this inability perpetuates
their anxiety symptoms (MacLeod, 1996). It is proposed
that individuals with high trait anxiety will have a more

difficult time withholding their attention from the
distracter stimuli in the Distracter condition than

individuals with low trait anxiety. If so, this will
negatively affect the maintenance of the cue-letter

presented at the beginning of the trial and by the time
the probe letter is presented context processing will be

compromised. The role of the distracters is to challenge
the update and maintenance components of the context

processing mechanism.
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If context processing is good, participants will be
able to successfully represent and maintain context

information and respond accordingly even in the presence

of distracting stimuli during the cue-probe delay. Good
representation of the letter "A" should still come at a

cost for participants on AY trials and more errors and.

slower reaction times should be present. Good maintenance
of the representation should also aid participants in
resisting the urge to press the target button on BX
trials, thus resulting in fewer errors and faster reaction

times'. On the other hand, when context processing is
compromised, we should observe fewer errors on AY trials

because the initially poor representation of the letter
"A" will worsen in the presence of distracters. In the

case of BX trials, distracters will interfere with the

maintenance of context representation and participants
will experience even greater difficulty inhibiting the

overwhelming urge to press the target button in the

presence of distracters. This will result in an increased
number of errors and slower reaction times in the BX

condition.
In the high demand condition, individuals in the high

anxiety group are expected to have particular difficulty
because their ability to represent and maintain context
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information, and thus exercising good attention and

inhibition in the presence of distracters will be
challenged. In this condition, context representation

deficits will worsen for the high anxiety group, resulting

in even fewer errors and faster reaction times on AY

trials in comparison with the AY trials on the Standard
AX-CPT. Further, context maintenance deficits will be
amplified in the high demand condition as well.

Performance of the high anxiety group will decline on BX

trials (greater error rate and slower reaction times) in
comparison with their performance on BX trials on the

Standard AX-CPT.
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CHAPTER TWO
METHODS
Participants
A total of 458 CSUSB undergraduates participated in

the pre-screening phase of this experiment and completed
the STAI-Y—2 scale. Taking part in the screening phase of
the study was open to all students. Based on the first

pre-screening sample of 153 students, STAI-Y-2 criteria
were established. Participants scoring in the top quartile

(M > 2.25) comprised the high anxiety group and those in
the bottom quartile comprised the low anxiety group
(M < 1.65). These criteria were used to select individuals
for the testing phase on all subsequent pre-screenings.

The population norm for the STAY-Y-2 scale has been
calculated to be 32.7 (SD = 9.9). From the total of 458

pre-screened students, 212 met the STAI-Y-2 criteria and
were selected to be in either the low or high anxiety

group. The remaining 246 participants were not selected to

continue because they did not meet the test criteria. A

total of 61 students (53 female and 8 male) participated
in the testing phase. A total-of 29 participants (2 male
and 27 female) and with mean age of 28.3 years (SD =

10.37) comprised the low anxiety group and scored a mean
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of 1.38

(SD = .15) and 1.61 (SD = .22) on the STAI-Y-2

(trait anxiety scale) and STAI-Y-1 (state anxiety scale)
respectively. A total of 28 participants (5 male and 23
female) with mean age of 23.7 years (SD = 5.51) comprised

the high anxiety group and scored a mean of 2.61

(SD = .30) and 2.13 (SD = .46) on the STAI-Y-2

(trait

anxiety scale) and STAI-Y-1 (state anxiety scale)
respectively. Participants were native English speakers
and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The students

participated voluntarily and were offered extra credit in
exchange for their participation. Participants were

treated in accordance with the "Ethical Principles of
Psychologists and Code of Conduct" (American Psychological
Association, 1992).
Design

The design of the present experiment was a 2 (Anxiety

level: high vs. low) X 2- (Non-target trial type: AY vs. BX
vs. BY) mixed factorial design with anxiety level as the
between factor and non-target trial type as the within
factor. Error rate and reaction time (RT) were measured

for each participant.
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Materials
Pre-Screening Phase

Participants were given a screening questionnaire the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Form Y). As mentioned
earlier, the STAI consists of two scales measuring state
and trait anxiety.. The STAI-Y-1, measuring state anxiety,

is composed of 20 items and they generally ask
participants to rate their feeling of anxiety at the

moment on a 4-point scale (1-not at all, 2-somewhat,
3-moderately so and 4-very much so). Examples of the items

in the scale are "I am tense" and "I am relaxed". The
STAI-Y-2, measuring trait anxiety, is composed of 20 items

and asks participants to rate how they feel about

themselves in general. Examples of such items are "I feel
satisfied with myself" and "I feel nervous and restless"
and the rating scale is a 4-point frequency scale

(1-almost never, 2 sometimes,' 3 often and 4-almost always

(Spielberger, 1983) .

The first STAI scale was developed in 1970. Since
then, its 40 different language translations have been

used continuously in clinical practice and empirical work.

Data from thousands of college students and hundreds of

neuropsychiatric patients have been used in the
establishment of the STAI scales. Since 1970, the scales
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have also undergone a number of revisions to improve their

psychometric qualities. For example, in order to represent
the anxiety construct better, during the last revision
(1983), 30% of the items were replaced because they

resembled depression more so than anxiety. Items such as

"I feel blue" and "I cry a lot" were eliminated. Also,
ambiguous items and items with marginal psychometric

properties were excluded. Reliability coefficients for the

Trait-anxiety scale are between .65 and .86. The range for
the State-anxiety scale was .16 to .62. This lower range
reflects the less-stable, situational nature of state
anxiety. As evidence for construct validity, Spielberger
(1983) presents correlations between the STAI scale and

other measures of trait-anxiety: the Taylor Manifest
Anxiety Scale (.80), the IPAT Anxiety Scale (.75), and the
Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (.52). Further, the

STAI scales have high levels of internal consistency;

Cornbach's (1951) alpha coefficients for each of the two
scales were .90 or higher (Telch, Shermis, &, Lucas,

1989). The correlation between the two STAI scales on a
standardized sample of individuals has been measured to

range between .59 and .75. The long history of use of this
scale is proof of its excellent psychometric qualities as
a tool to capture and measure anxiety.
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Task and Apparatus

Participants were tested on two versions of the
AX-CPT - a Standard version replicating Braver's model and
a high-demand (distracter) version, similar to Braver's

interference adaptation of AX-CPT. In both cases,
participants were instructed to identify target trails and

non-target trials. Every trial consists of a cue-probe
sequence. In the target trials, the cue was a letter A and

was followed by a probe that is the letter X (AX trials).
The cue-probe sequences were presented in a pseudo-random
order such that the target AX trials appeared at a 70%
rate. The frequency of each of the non-target trials (BX,
AY and BY) was at a 10% rate. The letters K and Y were
excluded from the task because they resemble the target

robe X and may hinder proper execution of the task. Each
letter was presented in the center of a computer screen
with black background. All letters were 24-point uppercase

Times New Roman font and red in color. Each stimulus was

presented for 300 ms on the screen and the interval
between each cue and probe measured 4900 ms

(inter-stimulus interval). Also, a 1000 ms interval
separated each trial (inter-trial interval).
Participants were instructed to make their response

by using keys on a computer keyboard. For right-handed
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participants, making a target response was possible by
pressing the "J" key with their index finger and a

non-target response with the "K" key and their middle
finger. For left-handed individuals, making a target

response was possible by pressing the "D" key with their

index finger and a non-target response by pressing the "S"
key with their middle finger. Participants were allowed an
interval of 1300 ms from the onset of the probe stimulus

to respond. Response times slower than 1300 ms were not
recorded and a message reading "Respond Faster" appeared

on the computer screen to prompt participants to respond

within the allowed time. Participants were■instructed to

respond as accurately and as quickly as possible.
The Distracter AX-CPT differs from the
above-described Standard version in that distracter
letters (other than A, X, K, or Y) appear on the screen

along with the cue and probe. Participants were instructed
to ignore the distracter letter. There were three
distracter stimuli appearing during the cue-probe delay

and they were 24-point uppercase Times New Roman font and
white in color. They appeared for 300 ms with a 1000 ms

interval between each distracter.
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Procedure
Pre-Screening Phase
With the consent of instructors, interested students

were asked to complete the STAI-Y-2 screening
questionnaire during class time and to provide contact

information (i.e., name, telephone number, and electronic
mail address). The first sample of 153 completed STAY-Y-2

surveys was used as the basis for creating criteria for

the high and low anxiety groups. The top and bottom
quartiles were selected to be the high and the low anxiety

groups. Students of any age, sex, and race/ethnicity were

invited to participate, as long as they met the screening
criterion, are native English speakers and have normal or
corrected-to-normal vision. Students who met the screening

criterion were telephoned and invited to participate by

the investigator or undergraduate research assistants.
Test Phase

Upon entering the laboratory, students were asked to
read and sign an informed consent document notifying them
about the purpose and procedure of the experiment. All
participants were asked to complete the STAI-Y-1 scale as

well. Then, participants were given instruction on how to
proceed with the AX-CPT task. A detailed description of

the task goals was displayed on the computer screen. The
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testing session consisted of 5 blocks of 30 trials for
each of the two conditions (Standard and Distracter

AX-CPT). There were a total of 150 trials per condition
and participants had a short break between each condition
before they began the task again. The first block of 30

trials were practice trials and were removed from all
statistical analyses. Also, the condition order and block
order were counterbalanced across all participants. All
participants were instructed to respond as quickly but as

accurately as possible. Upon completion of both
conditions, participants were debriefed, thanked for their
participation, and excused. The test phase' required

approximately 45 min to complete.

49

CHAPTER THREE
RESULTS.
Table 1 presents means and standard deviations for

relevant sample variables. As expected, the high and low

anxiety groups differed significantly on their state
anxiety scores, t(54) = -5.4. Also, the two anxiety groups
differed significantly in age, t(54) = 2.028. The mean

ages for the two groups were 28.3 and 23.7, respectively.

Table 2 presents the mean error rates and RTs of the high
and low anxiety groups in the target (AX) and non-target

(AY, BX, and BY) conditions. Trials in which the RTs were

less that 200 were assumed to be error given that

cognitive processing followed by motor response could not
have completed in less than 200ms.

In addition, any RTs

that were greater than 1200ms were considered outliers
given that such responses would have fallen more than 3

standard deviations from the grand mean. On such trials,
it was unclear if participants were not properly following
task instruction to respond as quickly but as accurately

as possible.
Trials in which correct RTs were less than 200 ms or

greater than 1200 ms, were excluded from the analysis. In
addition, two participants from the low anxiety group and
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one participant from the high anxiety group were excluded

from the analyses because they committed excessive number
of errors. Data from the Standard and Distracter tasks
were analyzed separately. Within each analysis, error rate

and RT data were analyzed separately for the target trial

(AX) and non-target trials (BY, BX, and AY). This was done

because target and non-target trials are presented to
participants at a different frequency rate (70% for target

trials and 30% for all non-target trials) and require
different response (target vs. non-target button). Only
correct responses were included in the analyses involving

RTs. Accuracy of performance in the target trials was
assessed using a d'-context measure and using false alarms

in the non-target trials. An alpha level of .05 was used
for all statistical tests. Participants' scores on the two

anxiety scales were significantly positively correlated,

r = .61.
Standard Task

Target Trials
Consistent with previous research using the AX-CPT

(e.g., Braver, Satpute, Rush, Racine, & Barch, 2005;

Braver, Barch, Keys, et al., 2001; Cohen, Barch, Carter, &
Servan-Schreiber, 1999; Lorsbach & Reimer, 2008; Paxton,
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Barch, Racine, & Braver, 2007), the analysis of
performance accuracy also examined d' context, a signal

detection measure that is based on the proportion of

trials in which a subject responds correctly in AX trials
by pressing the "Yes" key (Hits), relative to the

proportion of trials in which the subject responds
incorrectly in the BX condition by pressing the "Yes" key

(False Alarms). Because d' context is computed using only
BX false alarms, and not all types of false alarms (i.e.,
AY, BX, and BY), it is considered to provide a specific
estimate of sensitivity to context (Cohen et al., 1999).

That is to say, d' context provides a measure of one's

ability to use prior context (A or non-A) to differentiate
target and non-target responses to the letter X. Before
calculating d' scores, the hit and false alarm rates were
corrected by adding .5 to each frequency and dividing by

N + 1, where N equals the number of old or new trials
(Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). The low (M = 3.60) and high

(M = 3.34) anxiety groups produced statistically
comparable d' context scores, t(55) = 1.289. This was also

the case when the covariate (state anxiety measured by
STAI-Y-1) was included in the analysis, F(l,54) = .031,

MSE = .574.
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Error rates and RTs for target AX trials were also
analyzed for both groups. There was no significant mean

difference in error rates on the target (AX) trials among
the high (M = 6.6%) and low (M = 2.7%) anxiety groups,

t(55) = 1.260. Similarly, the mean RTs for the low
(M = 528 ms) and high (M = 511 ms) groups did not differ
significantly,

|t| < 1. Thus, the high and lbw anxiety

groups were comparable in terms of their error rates and

RTs on target trials. Similarly, when the covariate was

analyzed, no differences in error rates, F(l,54) = .130,
MSE = 0.013, and RTs, F(l,54) = 1.59, MSE = 9549.03, were
detected among the two groups.

Non-Target Trials
Non-target error rates and RTs were submitted

separately to a 2 (Anxiety group: low vs. high) x

3 (Non-target trial type: AY vs. BX vs. BY) mixed design
analysis of variance (ANOVA), with non-target trial type

as the within-subject factor (see Figures 8 & 9) . For

error rates, there was a marginally significant main
effect of anxiety group, F(l,55) = 2.885, MSE = 0.006,
p = .095, and a significant main effect of non-target

trial type, F(2,110) = 15.755, MSE = 0.005. For the main
effect of trial type, post hoc comparisons revealed that
participants committed more errors on the AY trials
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(M = 8.6%) than BX (M = 2.9%) and BY (M = 1.3%) trials.
However, mean error rates were not significantly different

on BX (M = 2.9%) and BY (M = 1.3% trials. The interaction
between anxiety group and trial type was not significant,

F < 1. When the covariate was included in the analysis,

the effects weakened. Specifically, there was no

significant main effect of anxiety group, F(l,54) = 1.877,
MSE = 0.007, and only a marginally significant main effect
of non-target trial type, F(2,108) = 2.979, p = .055. The
interaction between anxiety group and trial type was not
significant, F(2,108) = 1.617, MSE = 0.005

With the RT data, the main effect of anxiety group

was not significant, F(l,55) = .021, MSE = 41741.29.
However, there was a significant main effect of trial

type, F(2,110) = 117.386, MSE = 4634.21. Post hoc

comparisons revealed that RTs were significantly slower on
AY (M = 649 ms) than BX (M = 493 ms) trials, which were in
turn significantly slower than BY (M = 469 ms) trials.

Finally, the trial type by anxiety group interaction,
F < 1, was not significant. Results for the RT data when

the covariate was included were identical.
Performance on AY .and BX trials is of crucial

importance for the interpretation of participant's ability
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to process context effectively. If there are deficits in
context processing, individuals perform worse on BX trials
(more errors and slower RTs) than AY trials (fewer errors
and faster RTs). Therefore, planned comparisons were

conducted to examine whether error rates and RTs differed

on AY and BX trials separately for low and high anxiety

groups. With the low anxiety group, participants were
significantly slower on AY (M = 656 ms) than BX (M = 488

ms) trials, F(l,28) = 59.922, MSE - 6818.49. In addition,

error rates associated with AY trials (M = 6.7%) were

greater than error rates associated with BX trials
(M = 2.9%) and this difference approached significance,
F(l,28) = 3.718, MSE = 0.0006, p = .064. The results with
the inclusion of the covariate indicate that both effects

(RTs and error rates) were not significant. As with the
low anxiety group, participants in the high anxiety group
also produced significantly slower RTs on the AY (M = 643

ms) than the BX (M = 499 ms) trials, F(l,27) = 34.675,
MSE = 8361.75. Similarly, error rates associated with AY

(M = 10.5%) were significantly greater than the error

rates associated with BX (M = 3.1%) trials,
F(l,27) = 8.661, MSE = 0.009. This effect was not present

in the covariate analysis. However, the RT main effects

remained significant indicating that even when the
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covariate was included in the analysis, participants in
the high anxiety were slower on the AY {M = 643) trials in

comparison with the BX (M = 499) trials, F(l,26) = 14.230,
MSE = 7221.82.
Distracter Task

Target Trials

Identical to the analysis in the Standard task,
context sensitivity was again assessed in the Distracter
test data by using d' context analysis. In contrast to the

Standard task data, in the Distracter task, low anxiety
participants produced significantly larger d' context

scores than high anxiety participants, Ms = 3,73 and 3.25

respectively, t(55) = 3.096. When the covariate was
included, the results mirrored the direction of the above

pattern. However, the difference in context scores between

the two groups only approached significance at
F(l,54) = 3.546, p = .065.
There was no significant mean difference in error

rates on target (AX) trials among the high (M = 2.5%) and

low (M = 1.5%) anxiety groups, t(55) = 1.270. However,

participants in the low anxiety group (M = 537 ms)
produced slower RTs than did their high anxiety
counterparts (M = 486 ms), and this.comparison approached

56

statistical significance, t(55) = 1.751, p = .086 (see
Figures 10 & 11). When the covariate was included in the

analysis, no significant mean differences were found for

both error rates, F <1, and RTs, F(l,54) = 1.327,
MSE = 14.517.

Non-Target Trials

As with the Standard task set of analyses, non-target

error rates and RTs from the Distracter task were
submitted separately to a 2 (Anxiety group: low vs. high)
x 3 (Non-target trial type: AY vs. BX vs. BY) mixed design

ANOVA, with non-target trial type as the within-subject
factor. With the error rate data, the main effect of

anxiety group was not significant, F(l,55) = 2.455,
MSE = 0.012, however, there was a significant main effect

of non-target trial type, F(2,110) = 20.475, MSE = 0.009.
Post hoc comparisons indicated that error rates on the AY
(M = 11.4%) trials were greater than those on the BX

(M = 5.4%) trials, which were in turn greater than those
on the BY (M = 0.4%) trials. However, this main effect was
qualified by the presence of a marginally significant

non-target trial type by anxiety group interaction,
F(2,110) = 2.773, p = .067 (see Table 1 for means).

Results for the error rates when the covariate was

included were comparable.
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With the RT data, the main effect of anxiety group

was not significant, F(l,55) = 2.196, MSE = 36404.54.
However, the main effect of non-target trial type was

significant, F (2,110) = 170.619, MSE = 3676.69. Post hoc

comparisons revealed that RTs were slower on AY (M = 658

ms) than BX (M = 459 ms) trials, which were in turn slower
than BY (M = 499 ms) trials. Finally, as with the error

rate data the non-target trial type by anxiety group

interaction approached significance, F(2,110) = 2.981,

p = .055. Results for the error rates when the covariate
was included were comparable.
Recall that AY and BX trials are of great importance

when context processing is interpreted. Therefore, planned
comparisons were again conducted to examine whether- error
rates and RTs differed on AY and BX trials separately for

low and high anxiety groups. With the low anxiety group,
participants were significantly slower on AY (M = 669 ms)

than BX (M = 497 ms) trials, F(l,28) = 126.97,

MSE = 3385.39, p < .001 .In addition, error rates
associated with AY trials (M = 11.1%) were significantly

greater than error rates associated with BX trials
(M = 1.8%) , F(l,28) = 14.704, MSE = .009 , p < .00'1. The

effects in RTs remained even after the covariate was ■
included, F(l,27) = 18.927, MSE = 3038.11, p < .001. The
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effect in error rates was marginally significant,
F(l,27) = 3.994, MSE = .008, p = .056.
As with, the low anxiety group, participants in the

high anxiety group also produced significantly slower RTs

on the AY (M = 647 ms) than the BX (M = 422 ms) trials,
F(l,27) = 149.14, MSE = -4741.13, p < .001. However, unlike

the low anxiety group, in the high anxiety group, error

rates associated with AY (M = 11.7%) trials did not
statistically differ from the error rates associated with

BX (M = 9.1%) trials, F < 1. With the covariate, the
results for the high anxiety group were similar.

.

Specifically, there was no effect of error rate and the
effect of RTs remained, as AY RTs were slower than those
in BX, F(l,26) = 11.94, MSE = 4871.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DISCUSSION
The goal of the present study was to apply an
existing model of cognitive control to a new population -

individuals with elevated anxiety. By doing so, we hoped
to demonstrate that attention and inhibition deficits
experienced by individuals with high anxiety are related

to deficits in context processing. Recall that the basic

premise of Braver's model is that context processing
relies on the successful representation and maintenance of

context information. The process of representation allows
context to be used to direct behavior and resist
interference and the process of maintenance allows this

context information to be stored over time within working

memory. In AX-CPT, context information is provided by the

cue, which guides the appropriate response to the probe
(target or non-target). The high frequency of target AX

trials (70%), results in tendency to press target to the
probe X, regardless of the cue (BX trials) and to press

target to the cue A, regardless of the probe (AY trials).

The expectancy bias to the letter "A" facilitates
performance on the target AX trials but hinders it on the

non-target AY trials. Here, participants with good context
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processing are able to represent the cue A successfully
and therefore cannot resist the urge to press target in

the instances where the probe is a Y (non-target AY)

instead of an X (target AX). Thus, good context processing
results in poor accuracy and slower RTs on AY trials. The
high frequency of AX trials creates a bias affecting
performance on BX trials as well. The expectancy bias to

the letter "X" creates a tendency for a target response to
the probe "X", regardless of the cue. On BX trials,

individuals with good context processing are able to use
context information from the non-target cue "B" and
effectively inhibit their inclination to press target.

Good context processing results in fast and accurate
responses on BX trails. Generally, individuals with poor

context processing do not represent cue information well
and, thus, are not able to inhibit the biased target

response and display more BX than AY errors.
Target trial (AX) error rates and RTs for the

Standard task were comparable for the two anxiety groups,

when STAI scores were not included as a covariate.
Specifically, both groups were fast and accurate in
identifying AX trials as target trials. This comes to

indicate that group differences in trait anxiety did not
interfere with individuals' ability to use context in the
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AX trials. Further, analysis of the d' context scores
indicated that both anxiety groups were equally sensitive

to using prior context information. Thus, the valid (A)

and non-valid (non-A) cues were used to successfully guide
context equally with both groups. That is to say, anxiety
did not interfere with participant's ability to
distinguish between AX and BX trials. -

The pattern of results on non-target trials for the
Standard task is consistent with the analyses of target
trials. Specifically, of the two main effects, anxiety

group and trial type, only the latter one was significant.
Trait anxiety did not interfere with participants' ability
to represent and use context and therefore both groups

performed comparably. Participants displayed the signature
pattern of good context processing, where responses on AY

trials were slower and less accurate in comparison with
performance on BX trials (see Figure 8 & 9). Thus, despite

anxiety group differences, all participants were able to
represent and use context information successfully.

Comparable error rates and RTs in the AY vs. BX conditions

for each group indicate that due to the high frequency
target AX trials 1) participants formed strong expectancy

bias toward the cue A and falsely identified even
non-target trials containing the cue A, such as AY, as

62

target trials and 2) participants formed strong expectancy
bias toward the probe X but used context provided by the

non-target cue B to overcome it and successfully

identified'BX trials as non-target ones. More accurate and
fast performance on BX trials in comparison with AY

trials, across both groups, signals good context
processing despite anxiety differences. Further supporting

this conclusion, planned comparisons revealed nearly

identical pattern of performance for each group. There
were significantly more errors and' slower RTs^ in the AY

condition in comparison with the BX condition, and this
was the case for each anxiety group. Once again, pattern

of good context processing was evident.
In addition, the Standard task used a long (5 s)
cue-probe delay, which in Braver's studies, is used to

test one's ability to maintain context representation over
time in working memory.. Thus, the cue must not'only be

represented, but also actively maintained in working
memory over the delay. The performance on AY and BX trials
observed in our experiment (faster and more accurate BX
than AY) is evidence for good maintenance of context by
both anxiety groups. All participants, regardless of their

anxiety level, were able to both form a context
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representation and maintain this representation in working

memory.

In summary, recall that in Braver's signature pattern
of good context processing there are greater AY errors and

slower RTs than errors and RTs associated with BX trials
(see Figure 2). Using the two biases created by the high

frequency AX trials, context improves performance in the

BX trials and hinders performance in the AY trials. The
lack of group difference in the Standard task was

unanticipated. Initially, we expected that trait anxiety

would affect performance on the AX-CPT differentially,
hindering the high anxiety group. In the present

experiment, we find no evidence for anxiety interference

on context processing. At the level of the low demand

Standard task, both anxiety groups were able to use
context information successfully.

This finding, although unexpected, is particularly ■
noteworthy because individuals with high anxiety are known

to display cognitive deficits in attention and inhibition

(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Kane & Engle, 2003).
According to Braver (Braver & Barch, 2002), the

context-processing unit is vital not only in attention and
inhibition, but also in processes dependent on cognitive

control in working memory. The second, Distracter task,
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used in this experiment was designed to increase cognitive
demand (i.e., working memory capacity) during the AX-CPT.

Recall from earlier discussion that the Distracter task
differed from the Standard task only in one aspect - three

distracter letters appeared during the cue-probe delay

(Figure 4). The purpose of this manipulation was to test

context processing performance in a condition of increased
cognitive demand. Based on analysis excluding the

covariate, the results from the Distracter task provided
evidence supporting the overall hypothesis that

individuals with high and low anxiety differ in their
ability to use context under conditions of high cognitive
demand.

In the Distracter task, target trial (AX) error rates
and RTs were comparable for the two anxiety groups, when

STAI scores- were not included as a covariate. Both groups
were fast and accurate in identifying AX trials as target

trials, which indicates some initial level of good context
processing. However, in contrast to the Standard task

data, in the Distracter task, low anxiety participants

produced significantly larger d' context scores than high,
anxiety participants. The larger d' scores of low anxiety
participants indicate that they were, relative to high

anxiety participants, more proficient at using prior
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context information in their attempt to distinguish
targets and non-targets. That is to say, the group

differences in d' context scores indicate that when

presented with an X probe, participants in the low group
were more sensitive to the preceding context (i.e., A or

non-A) than participants in the high group.
Overall analysis of non-target trials painted picture
similar to the one in the low demand, Standard task where

we found a robust main effect of trial type but no effect

of anxiety on performance. However, the marginally

significant trial type by anxiety group interaction
demanded that planned comparisons for each group are
examined independently. These comparisons revealed that

the low anxiety group performed comparably on both tasks
(Standard and Distracter) by displaying the signature
pattern of good context processing. Specifically, error

rate was higher and- RTs were slower in the AY condition
compared to the BX condition. Participants in the low
anxiety groups used context successfully to overcome the
bias to press target in BX trials and identified BX as

non-target trials fast and accurate. Thus, inhibitory
response on BX trials was effective. The low anxiety group

was able to use context information from the non-target B
cue and successfully override the tendency to press target
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when the probe X is presented. Also, the increased number

of AY errors indicates that low anxiety participants were
able to represent context well and form the strong
expectancy bias toward the cue letter A and therefore were

slower and less accurate than in the BX condition.
Remarkably, this pattern of good context processing

persisted in the presence of the distracter letters. They
did not interfere with low anxiety participants' ability

to actively maintain context representation even under

condition of increased demand on working memory.

The high anxiety group, however, performed
differently on non-target trials than the low anxiety

group in the Distracter task. While displaying good
context processing in the Standard task, participants with
high trait anxiety were challenged in the high demand task
and displayed a pattern of error rates and RTs
characteristic of poor context processing. Specifically,

error rates and RTs on the non-target AY and BX trials
were comparable. As pointed out earlier, the successful

use of context improves performance in the BX trials and
hinders performance in the AY trials. In the case of the

high anxiety group, however, during the Distracter task
performance was hindered in both, the AY and the BX
condition.
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This comes to say that trait anxiety had no influence

on participants' ability to process context successfully
unless conditions of high cognitive demand were present.

In fact, the low anxiety group was able to use context
effectively and show the signature pattern of good context

processing despite distracter interference. The predicted
differences were revealed only when the high anxiety group
failed to maintain context in the presence of distracters.

Recall that good performance on an AX-CPT with a long

delay between cue and probe requires active context
maintenance. In the present experiment, both tasks

(Standard and Distracter) had a long (5sec) delay and thus
provided, context maintenance assessment. This assessment
indicates that context maintenance was good for both
groups during the Standard task; specifically, high and

low anxiety groups were able to hold the cue information
in working memory over the 5sec delay and use it
effectively to guide probe responses. Further, this type

of performance persisted for the low anxiety group in the

Distracter task, where interfering stimuli were displayed

during the 5sec delay. Participants in the low anxiety
group were able to overcome the possible negative effect

of distracters and despite the increased demand on working
memory were still able to use context effectively. As
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revealed by the pattern of performance, this was not the

case with the high anxiety group. The presence of

distracters compromised their ability to effectively

maintain cue context in working memory and when faced with
the decision to respond to a probe "X" with target or
non-target, high anxiety participants were unable to

resist the urge to press target. Their performance during

the Distracter task had comparable error rates and RTs for
both AY and BX trial types, instead of more errors and

slower RTs in AY in comparison with BX condition.
Therefore, the present study does provide indication of

existing group differences in context processing, but only
under condition of increased cognitive demand. Recall that
both tasks had a long delay between cue and probe

presentation, which somewhat increases cognitive demand in

comparison with a short delay AX-CPT and reguires active

maintenance of context within working memory. In the
Standard task, anxiety did not interfere with context
maintenance. However, in the presence of distracters, the

high anxiety participants experienced great difficulty to
actively maintain and protect context. The difference
between the two groups must be attributed to processes

related to the resistance-of-interference component of
context maintenance.
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As discussed earlier, accounts of the detrimental

effect of anxiety on some cognitive processes have a long
history in the empirical literature (Liebert & Morris,

1967; MacLeod, 1991a; Mogg & Marden, 1980). Anxiety or

being occupied with worrisome thoughts, is considered to
interfere with one's ability to attend and process task

relevant information and thus results in performance
deficits on the task overall. Recall that numerous studies

have attempted to describe and explain cognitive deficits

in attention and inhibition (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Kane
& Engle, 2003; MacLeod, 1991a) as well as working memory

(MacLeod & Donnellan, 1993) that individuals with high

anxiety seem to display on a consistent basis. Despite the
abundance of such studies, a straightforward and
parsimonious explanation of the origin of anxiety-related
cognitive deficits was lacking. The main goal of this

investigation was to set a unitary framework where

attention, inhibition and working memory are the results

of a single mechanism, the context processing mechanism.
This approach would allow for assessment of all three
common cognitive deficits to be tested simultaneously. If

deficits were detected, they would be ultimately
associated with context processing, a mechanism that is

grounded in neurobiology and is tested via task that
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allows for its three main components (attention,
inhibition an working memory) to be assessed concurrently
and independently. Moreover, the purpose of having two
versions of the AX-CPT task, Standard and Distracter, was

to differentiate between situations with normal and high
cognitive demand. The reasoning here was that it is

possible that the effects of anxiety on context processing
may not be displayed unless there is an increased level of

demand on one's cognitive processing. Thus, even if
context processing was comparable for both groups in the

Standard task, we predicted that differences would arise
during the high demand Distracter task and the high

anxiety group will show performance deficits
characteristic of poor context processing. The results of

this investigation provide evidence to support this
notion.
A theory set forth by Eysenc and Calvo (1992)

proposes that processing efficiency accounts for
performance deficits associated with anxiety. This theory

suggests that elevated anxiety hinders performance on
tasks that rely on some involvement of working memory.

This is the case because the anxiety and anxious thoughts
these individuals experience take some processing
resources away from the actual task at hand (Richards,
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French, Keogh, & Carter, 2000). Similarly, the Distracter

task used in the current investigation placed a heavier
demand on resources used within working memory participants had to hold and protect the representation of

context and the goal of the task in working memory during
a 5 second delay and in the presence of distracter

stimuli. When interfering stimuli were not present

(Standard task), both groups performed well and showed
good context processing, even with a long 5-second delay.
In the Distracter task, however, the high anxiety group
failed to protect context in the presence of distracter

and showed poor context processing.

Interestingly, when scores from the STAI-Y-1 (state

anxiety scale) state were included in the analyses as a
covariate, the effects described above were generally
weaker, and, in some cases, disappeared. This indicates

that although differences in context processing appear to

be associated with high anxiety, it is unclear whether

they are due to trait, state or of the effects of both
types of anxiety. The groups in the present investigation

were based on stable, personality differences in trait
anxiety and although evidence of their association with
deficits in context processing was found, state anxiety

appears to play a role as well-. Consistent with literature
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using state and trait anxiety measures, scores on both

scales in this investigation were significantly positively

correlated (.61). In the spirit of this relationship,

individuals with high trait anxiety are also likely to
display heightened sensitivity to anxiety provoking

situation and thus display elevated state anxiety scores.

It is possible that participants treated the novel lab
environment where they were tested and where they
completed the state anxiety questionnaire, as one
provoking anxiety. Thus, it is impossible to disentangle

the relationship between state and trait' anxiety to a
degree to which their unique effect on context processing

can be determined. Also, it is possible that the
relationship between trait anxiety and context processing

is partially mediated by state anxiety.
Limitations

It is important to note that the current
investigation is the first of its kind to test the context

processing model of cognitive control on individuals with
high and low anxiety, and therefore has some reasonable

limitations. Specifically, although a large number of
potential participants were pre-screened (458), less than
half (212) qualified by meeting the screening criteria. Of
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this number, an even smaller fraction (61) participated in

the lab portion of the study. Therefore, the small sample
may bear some responsibility on the effects that were only

marginally significant. With a larger sample, these
effects, which are in the expected direction, can be
anticipated to be significantly so. Also, the STAI-Y-2

(trait anxiety scale) cut-off score for the high and low

group was based on the top and bottom quartiles of the
first pre-screening group of 153 students. It was
anticipated that this sample would be sufficient for the

selection of all participants needed for the experiment.
As pointed out earlier, however, fewer than expected
numbers of students answered the call to come into the lab
and complete the AX-CPT session. Therefore, the need for
subsequent pre-screening arose. The cutoff scores
established from the first sample of 15 students for the

high and low anxiety groups were used in the subsequent
screenings. It is possible that these cut-off scores were

not discriminative enough. Specifically, compared to the
norm score for the STAY-Y-2 scale (32.7), the low anxiety

group scores were 27.6, which is close but not quite one

standard deviation (9.9) below the normative score. The
mean score for the high anxiety group score was 56, which

is well above one standard deviation from the norm. Thus,
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the cutoff score for the low anxiety group should have
been set at least one standard deviation below the norm.

Further, it has been reported than men tend to underreport
on the STAI-Y-2 scale and therefore separate cutoff scores'
for the male and female participants should have been

established. Since both genders were considered at the
same time, the lower scores of., the male participants may
have caused a lower overall mean for trait anxiety. The

effect of differential reporting may have been
particularly problematic given the fact that there were

more male in the high group (5) than in the low group (2).
Future studies may consider using more stringent and

consistent criteria for selecting high and low anxiety
participants, as well as selecting from a male and female

sample independently. Another possible limitation

regarding the STAI-Y-2 scale is that participants
completed the scale only at pre-screening. It is possible

that some participants'

(in both the low and the high

anxiety group) score would have regressed toward the mean
for the STAI-Y-2. If participants had to take the scale as
part of the lab session, a more precise measure of trait

anxiety could have been obtained. Only participants who
scored consistently above or below the STAI-Y-2 mean could
have been selected for the experiment. It is possible that
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the lack of significant anxiety effects in the Standard

task is due to the diluted trait anxiety scores.
In regards to the AX-CPT itself, some alterations may
be beneficial. The first block of trials in the current

study was not included in the investigation because it was
used as a demonstration for the participants. This led to
r
only four complete blocks of trials per task be included
in the final analysis. Further, although Braver's ratio of
70% target (AX) and 30% non-target (BY, BX, and AY) trials
in the AX-CPT was unchanged, the total number of trials

was slightly reduced in order to shorten the total
duration of the experimental session. Ideally,
participants would be invited to participate in two

experimental sessions, one for the Standard and another

for the Distracter task. Although the order of AX-CPT

versions was completely randomized for all participants,

there may be some interference associated with
participants' level of fatigue. The AX-CPT is a monotonous

task that requires participants to be continuously
attentive and motivated to respond as quickly but as
accurately as possible. If participants take each AX-CPT

version at a different time, they could be exposed to a

larger overall number of trials in a shorter amount of

time, which will remove some of the fatigue related error.

It is worth noting that the two groups were
significantly different in age. The low anxiety group was

comprised of participants that were older than the
participants in the high anxiety group. Although there is

no theoretical reason to expect differences in context
processing in a sample if healthy young adults, such

difference was detected. Interestingly, individuals in the

low anxiety group displayed good context processing on

both tasks, while, participants in the younger, high
anxiety group displayed poor context processing on the
Distracter task. Thus, although an unexpected difference

was detected, it was in direction opposite of possible
theoretical expectations. Last, the design of the present
investigation does not allow of the independent effect of

state and trait anxiety on context processing to be
examined precisely. Participants were selected on their

score on the STAI-Y-2 (trait anxiety) scale and their
state anxiety was merely assessed at the time of testing.

Future experimental designs may include a state anxiety
manipulation on a randomly selected population to identify
how anxiety that stems from the situation itself, can be
affecting context processing.
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Implications

Readers must keep in mind that the present study is
the first in associating anxiety and context processing

deficits. However, the results of this study, although
interpreted with caution, are important in providing a
research framework for investigating anxiety symptoms and

their relation to attention, inhibition and working
memory. Moreover, these results are especially important
for the anxiety literature because it has examined anxiety

related cognitive deficits one dimensionally. The present
investigation provides evidence of a single underlying

mechanism (context processing) that can explain multiple
cognitive deficits concurrently. Such unitary explanation

is simpler and more integrative in accounting for

cognitive deficits.
In addition to contributing to our understanding of
the effects of anxiety on cognitive control, although the

present study was not designed to examine cognitive
control in the workplace, it may have implications for the
workplace. The workplace provides situations high in

stress and/or task complexity that are analogous of the

situations created in this experiment. Therefore, we may
speculate that in conditions of low cognitive demand or

low demand on working memory capacity, as in the Standard
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task, differences in anxiety will not interfere with task

performance.. Individuals with high trait anxiety in entry
level positions or ones with more basic and routine task
load, may not experience any deficits based on their

personality characteristic. Most workplaces, however, are
dynamic, stress provoking, and filled with tasks and

demands that are rarely predictable and stable. This is
especially the case in middle and high-level positions.

Recall that in such high demand situations, participants
in the high anxiety group experienced deficits in
cognitive control and performed worse than individuals in

the low anxiety group. The implication for these

individuals in the workplace is that as demand and
complexity of tasks increase, performance deficits will

begin to surface.
Therefore, stable individual differences in trait

anxiety can be a predictor of job performance and
promotion rate. An employee with high trait anxiety can

perform successfully in an entry-level position, where
most tasks are predictable and routine, and close

supervision and one-on-one training are available.
However, in mid- and high-level positions, complexity and

ambiguity in daily tasks increase dramatically. Employees

with high trait anxiety who have worked successfully in an

79

entry-level position will be exposed to work situations
that resemble the Distracter version of our task. They
will be required to hold more information in working
♦

memory, have higher interruption rate and will have to be

effective in selecting what information is relevant and
needs their attention and what information is irrelevant
and distractive. Individuals with high trait anxiety may

fail to perform at higher-level positions or in

occupations where one must withstand the presence of
distracters . Thus, it is possible that employees with high

trait anxiety have difficulties promoting into mid- and
high-level positions.
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Table 1 Means and standard deviations for relevant sample variables

Trait Anxiety
SD
Mean

Age
Mean
SD

State Anxiety
Mean
SD

Low Anxiety
Group

28.3

10.4

1.38

0.15

1.61

0.23

High Anxiety
Group

23.7

5.5

2.61

0.3

2.13

0.46
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Table 2. Mean error rates and RTs of high and low anxiety groups in
target (AX) and non-target (AY, BX, and BY) conditions
RTs

Error Rates
AX
AY

BX

BY

AX

AY

BX

BY

Standard Low

Mean

2.3

6.7

2.7

0.3

529

656

488

475

Task

SD

0.1

0.8

0.1

0.01

91

103

145

114

0.1

10.5

3.1

2.4

512

643

499

463

SD

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

105

106

176

124

Distracter Low

Mean

1.5

11.1

1.8

0.3

537

669

497

516

Task

SD

0.1-

0.1

0.1

0.01

113

128

124

131

2.5

11.7

9.1

0.4

487

647

422

483

0.1

0.2

0.1

0.02

103

123

108

108

High Mean

High Mean

SD
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Active Memory

Figure Captions

Figure 1. Braver’s canonical model (PFC - prefrontal cortex, DA - dopamine)

85

Trial Type
Figure 2. Context Processing Signature Pattern - Standard AX- CPT
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Time

Figure 3. AX-CPT - Task Presentation
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A..............................X....... B...

Standard

AX-CPT:

Distracter

AX - CPT: A.... D..... E..... K.....X...... B....

Figure 4. Two task conditions - Standard and Distracter AX-CPT
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Trial Type
Figure 5. Expected Performance on the High Demand AX-CPT
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Trial Type
Figure 6. High and Low Anxiety Groups Performing on the Standard AX-CPT

90

Trial Type
Figure 7. High and Low Anxiety groups performing on the high demand AX-CPT
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Figure 8. Standard Task: Error rate performance of low and high anxiety groups each
of the target and non-target trial types. Error bars reflect standard errors of the means.
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Figure 9. Standard Task: RT performance of low and high anxiety groups each of the
target and non-target trial types. Error bars reflect standard errors of the means.
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Figure 10. Distracter Task: Error rate performance of low and high anxiety groups
each of the target and non-target trial types. Error bars reflect standard errors of the
means.
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Figure 11. Distracter Task: Performance of low and high anxiety groups each of the
target and non-target trial types. Error bars reflect standard errors of the means.
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STAI-Y-1 Scale measuring state anxiety
STAI-FORMY-1
DATE:

GENDER:

AGE:

DIRECTIONS: A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given
below. Read each statement and circle the number on the scale below to indicate how you feel right
now, that is, at this moment. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any
one statement but give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best.
MODERATELY VERY MUCH
SO
SO

NOTAT
ALL

SOMEWHAT

1 I feel calm

1

2

3

4

2 I feel secure

1

2

3

4

3 I am tense

1

2

3

4

4 I feel strained

1

2

3

4

5 I feel at ease

1

2

3

4

6 I feel upset

1

2

3

4

I am presently worried over
7 possible misfortunes

1

2

3

4

8 I feel satisfied

1

2

3

4

9 I feel frightened

1

2

3

4

10 I feel comfortable

1

2

3

4

11 I feel self-confident

1

2

3

4

12 I feel nervous

1

2

3

4

13 I am jittery

1

2

3

4

14 I feel indecisive

1

2

3

4

15 I am relaxed

1

2

3

4

16 I feel content

1

2

3

4

17 I am worried

1

2

3

4

18 I feel confused

1

2

3

4

19 I feel steady

1

2

3

4

20 I feel pleasant

1

2

3

4

Statement

#

STAI-Y-2 scale measuring trait anxiety.
STAI-FORMY-2
DATE:
AGE:
GENDER:
DIRECTIONS: A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given
below. Read each statement and circle the number on the scale below to indicate how you feel generally
feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give
the answer which seems to describe how you generally feel.
ALMOST
ALMOST
Statement
#
ALWAYS
NEVER SOMETIMES OFTEN
2
3
4
21 I feel pleasant
1
2
4
3
22 I feel nervous and restless
1
2
3
4
23 I feel satisfied with myself
1
I wish I could be as happy as others seem to
2
3
4
24
1
be
2
3
4
25 I feel like a failure
1
2
3
4
26 I feel rested
1
2
3
4
1
27 I am "calm, cool and collected"
I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I
2
3
4
1
28
cannot overcome them
I worry too much over something that really
2
3
4
1
29
doesn't matter
2
3
4
1
30 I am happy
2
3
4
31 I have disturbing thoughts
1
2
3
4
32 I lack self-confidence
1
2
4
3
1
33 I feel secure
4
2
3
1
34 I make decisions easily
2
4
3
1
35 I feel inadequate
2
3
4
1
36 I am content
Some unimportant thought runs through my
3
4
2
1
37
mind and bothers me
I take disappointments so keenly that I can't
2
3
4
1
38
put them out of my mind
2
3
4
1
39 I am steady person
I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I
4
2
3
1
40
think over me recent concerns and interests
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INFORMED CONSENT

STAI - Prescreening
You are invited to participate in a study designed to investigate cognitive processing.
This study is being conducted by Viara Stankova under the supervision of Dr. Jason
Reimer, Professor of Psychology. This study has been approved by the Department of
Psychology Institutional Review Board Sub-Committee of the California State
University, San Bernardino, and a copy of the official Psychology IRB stamp of
approval should appear on this consent form.

In this study you will be asked to respond to a survey. The survey will take
approximately 20 minutes to complete. All of your responses will be held in the
strictest of confidence by the researchers. You are being asked to provide contact
information that will be used to invite you for follow up research session. Be assured
that all data will be kept in strictest confidentiality and will be reported in group form
only. Results from this study will be available from Dr. Jason Reimer (909) 537-7578
after January 1, 2009.

Your participation in this study is totally voluntary. You are free not to answer any
question and withdraw at any time during this study without penalty. This study
involves no risks beyond those of everyday life, nor any direct benefits to you as an
individual. When you have completed the survey, you will receive a debriefing
statement describing the study in more detail. In order to ensure the validity of the
study, we ask that you not discuss this study with other participants.
If you have any questions or concerns about this study, please feel free to contact
professor Jason Reimer at (909) 537-7578.

By placing a check mark in the box below, I acknowledge that I have been informed
of, and that I understand, the nature and purpose of this study, that I freely consent to
participate, and that at the conclusion of the study, I may ask for additional explanation
regarding the study. I also acknowledge that I am at least 18 years of age.
Place a check mark here □

Today date:____________________
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INFORMED CONSENT
Context Processing
You are invited to participate in a study designed to investigate cognitive processing.
This study is being conducted by Viara Stankova under the supervision of Dr. Jason
Reimer, Professor of Psychology. This study has been approved by the Department of
Psychology Institutional Review Board Sub-Committee of the California State
University, San Bernardino, and a copy of the official Psychology IRB stamp of
approval should appear on this consent form.
In this study you will be asked to complete a computer based task, where you will be
presented with a series of letters on a computer screen. You are asked to respond to
specific sequences of letters with either target or non-target response. The task should
take no longer than 40-50 minutes of your time. All of your responses will be held in
the strictest of confidence by the researchers. All data will be reported in group form
only. Since no identifying information is collected on the survey, all your responses
will be completely anonymous. Results from this study will be available from Dr.
Jason Reimer (909) 537-7578 after Januaiy 1, 2009.

Your participation in this study is totally voluntary. You are free not to answer any
question and withdraw at any time during this study without penalty. This study
involves no risks beyond those of everyday life, nor any direct benefits to you as an
individual. When you have completed the survey, you will receive a debriefing
statement describing the study in more detail. In order to ensure the validity of the
study, we ask that you not discuss this study with other participants.
If you have any questions or concerns about this study, please feel free to contact Dr.
Jason Reimer at (909) 537-7578.

By placing a check mark in the box below, I acknowledge that I have been informed
of, and that I understand, the nature and purpose of this study, that I freely consent to
participate, and that at the conclusion of the study, I may ask for additional explanation
regarding the study. I also acknowledge that I am at least 18 years of age.
Place a check mark here □

Today date:____________________
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Debriefing Statement

STAI - Prescreening
The short survey that you have just completed was designed to measure your anxiety
level. There are two types of anxiety assessed by this survey - state and trait anxiety.
State anxiety is defined as unpleasant arousal in the face of danger or in threatening
situation. Trait anxiety on the other hand, measured stable individual differences in the
tendency to respond with state anxiety in the anticipation of threatening situations.
We have asked that you provide contact information in case you wish to participate in
the second part of this study. If you chose to do so, your contact information will only
be used to contact you and set up your visit in our research lab. After that, your contact
information will be separated from this survey and destroyed. We assure you that your
confidentiality will be kept at all times during the research process.
Thank you for your participation and for not discussing the contents of this study with
other students who may in the future participate as well. If you have any questions
about the study, please feel free to contact Professor Jason Reimer at (909) 537-7578.
If you would like to obtain a copy of the group results of this study, please contact
Professor Jason Reimer at (909) 537-7578 in February 2009.
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Debriefing Statement

Context Processing
This study you have just completed was designed to investigate how anxiety levels
may be related to the representation and maintenance of information in memory in
order to guide future decisions. In the computer task that you just completed, you had
to use context in order to perform well. There were four conditions where the letters
were manipulated: AX (both cue and target were valid), AY (cue was valid but target
was not valid), BX (non-valid cue but valid target). BY sequences were used as a
control condition since both cue and probe were non-valid. Typically adults perform
well on the AX condition, but make more errors in the AY condition than the BX
condition. This pattern indicates good use of context to guide future behavior. In this
experiment we will compare the performances of groups of individuals that have either
high or low trait anxiety and examine the pattern of their performance.

Thank you for your participation and for not discussing the contents of this study with
other students who may in the future participate as well. If you have any questions
about the study, please feel free to contact Professor Jason Reimer at (909) 537-7578.
If you would like to obtain a copy of the group results of this study, please contact
Professor Jason Reimer at (909) 537-7578 in February 2009.
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